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Abstract—This paper studies a wireless network where multi-
ple users cooperate with each other to improve the overall net-
work performance. Our goal is to design an optimal distributed
power allocation algorithm that enables user cooperation, in
particular, to guide each user on the decision of transmission
mode selection and relay selection. Our algorithm has the nice
interpretation of an auction mechanism with multiple auctioneers
and multiple bidders. Specifically, in our proposed framework,
each user acts as both an auctioneer (seller) and a bidder (buyer).
Each auctioneer determines its trading price and allocates power
to bidders, and each bidder chooses the demand from each
auctioneer. By following the proposed distributed algorithm,
each user determines how much power to reserve for its own
transmission, how much power to purchase from other users,
and how much power to contribute for relaying the signals of
others. We derive the optimal bidding and pricing strategies
that maximize the weighted sum rates of the users. Extensive
simulations are carried out to verify our proposed approach.
Index Terms—Cooperative communications, user cooperation,
power allocation, distributed algorithm, auction theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
By exploiting the inherent broadcast nature of wireless
radio waves, users can cooperate and improve the network
throughput and energy efficiency in wireless networks [2]–[5].
Although the performance of small-scale cooperative commu-
nications has been extensively studied from an information
theoretic perspective, there still exist many open problems
of realizing the full potential of cooperative communication
schemes in practical large-scale networks.
In this paper, we design a distributed resource allocation
framework for cooperative communications that addresses
several key practical challenges. First of all, forwarding other
users’ packets consumes valuable resources (e.g., battery
energy, transmission slots or bandwidth) and may degrade
a user’s own performance. Therefore, we need to design a
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mechanism that guides distributed users to cooperate. Second,
determining whether and how to perform cooperative trans-
mission depend on channel conditions between users and can
be complicated. Third, when cooperative communication is
desirable, there can be more than one user that is suitable
to serve as the relay. Thus, we need to decide how to select
the transmission mode (direct or relay transmission) and the
associated relay node(s) for each source node. Fourth, if a
user decides to help others relaying the messages, it needs
to balance the resource (such as power, bandwidth, and time
slots) reserved for itself and the resource provided for others.
Therefore, we need to design a mechanism so that each user
captures the optimal tradeoff of resource allocation.
Previous work on resource allocation in cooperative net-
works fall into two categories: centralized (e.g., [6]–[12]) and
distributed (e.g., [13]–[18]). The centralized schemes often
require global channel state information (CSI), thus are often
not scalable due to the large signaling overhead. Distributed
schemes based on local information and limited message
passing are thus more favorable in practical systems. There
have been several results on distributed resource allocation
in cooperative networks. For example, a distributed power
allocation algorithm for single source-destination pair multi-
relay networks was presented in [16] based on the Stackelberg
game model, where a source is modeled as a buyer and
relays are modeled as sellers. The power allocation is only
performed by the relays but not by the source. The authors
in [17] studied an auction-based distributed power allocation
scheme for the case where multiple source-destination pairs
are assisted by a fixed single relay node. Therein, the relay
acts as the auctioneer and the sources act as the bidders. Like
in [16], [17] also adopts relay-power allocation assuming that
the sources’ power are fixed. Authors in [18] investigated
distributed power allocation in a multiple source-destination
pairs and single relay network, where the relay sets prices
and multiple sources act as a non-cooperative game. This
work assumed that the relay’s power is fixed and the power
optimization is done by the sources.
In this paper, we propose a new auction-based power alloca-
tion framework for multi-user cooperative networks, with the
objective of maximizing the weighted sum rates of the users.
Specifically, we design a distributed power allocation algo-
rithm which has the nice interpretation of a multi-auctioneer
multi-bidder power auction, in which each user acts as both
an auctioneer and a bidder. Each auctioneer independently
announces its trading price and sells power, and each bidder
dynamically decides whether to buy, from which auctioneer(s)
to buy, and how much to buy. By following the proposed
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Fig. 1: An example of the cooperative communication with
two users (transmitter-receiver pairs). Ti and Ri denote the
transmitter and receiver of user i, respectively.
distributed mechanism, each user can achieve the optimal
resource utilization and maximize the system weighted sum
rates in a fully distributed fashion.
Our paper distinctly differs from the previous work [16]–
[18] in threefold: 1) unlike those work considering the relay-
assisted cooperative communications with dedicated relays,
we study the user cooperation scenario where users cooperate
and help each other; 2) unlike these results only optimize
relay-power [16], [17] or source-power [18], we optimize
the power allocation of each transmitting node to tradeoff
the resource consumption of transmitting its own traffic and
forwarding other nodes’ traffic; 3) by employing distributed
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques (e.g., [19],
[20]) for relay transmission, our proposed power allocation
scheme implicitly incorporates both relay selection and trans-
mission mode selection between direct transmission and relay
transmission, which enables each user to decide whether to
cooperate, whom to cooperate with, and how to cooperate
in a distributed fashion through a unified framework. We
also discuss some implementation issues of the proposed
distributed mechanism in practical wireless networks, includ-
ing synchronization, channel estimation, interaction procedure,
and step-size selections.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the system model and the problem formula-
tion. Section III presents the details of the proposed multi-
auctioneer and multi-bidder power auction. Extensive simu-
lations are provided in Section IV. Finally we conclude the
paper in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The network consists of K cooperative users, each of which
has its own source node and destination node. Different users
have distinct source nodes, but may share the same destination
node. The users can cooperate with each other, thus the
source node of a user can be a transmitter and a forwarder
simultaneously. The main idea of cooperative transmission is
to utilize the extra power available at those source nodes,
by enabling them to act as relays for those sources who are
far from their destinations. Such cooperative transmission can
be regarded as a distributed multiple-antenna system. Each
node is subject to the half-duplex constraint, so that it cannot
transmit and receive at the same time over the same channel.
It is possible, however, for the node to transmit and receive
simultaneously on different channels.
Let K = {1, 2, ...,K} be the set of users. Each user is
allocated an orthogonal channel to transmit its own data in-
formation.1 Without loss of generality, we assume that channel
i is allocated to user i. The cooperative transmission includes
two phases, with an example shown in Fig. 1. In the first phase,
the source node of user i (1 ≤ i ≤ K) transmits the message
to its own destination on channel i and listens on all other
channels. In the second phase, some source nodes (who have
the proper channel conditions and extra transmission power)
form a distributed MIMO system and simultaneously help to
relay the signals of user i on channel i by using distributed
space-time codes [19], [20].
The K×K matrix p denotes the transmission power, where
pj,i denotes the amount of power that the source node of user
j contributes to forwarding user i’s information for i 6= j, or
the amount of power user i consumes for its own transmission
for i = j. The sum of the jth row of p represents the total
power consumption of user j, which is subject to a peak
power constraint pj . Note that this power matrix implicitly
accounts for transmission mode and relay node adaptations.
For instance, if p is a diagonal matrix, then only direct
transmission is selected; full user cooperation is selected if
all the elements of p are non-zero.
Let R be a K × 1 vector whose element Ri denotes the
achievable rate of user i at a given power allocation vector
{pj,i}Kj=1. This achievable rate definition can accommodate
different distributed MIMO techniques, such as the nonre-
generative based amplify-and-forward (AF) and regenerative
based decode-and-forward (DF) relay strategies. The detailed
expression of rate Ri will be given later.
The global network objective is to allocate the power on
each source node in order to maximize the weighted sum rates
of the users. The optimization problem can be formulated as
follows (P1):
P1: max
∑
i∈K
wiRi (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈K
pj,i ≤ pj , ∀j ∈ K (2)
variables p  0, (3)
where wi is the weight that represents the priority of user i.
If date rate Ri for each user i is a concave function of the
power vector {pj,i}Kj=1, then the objective function is concave
as any positive linear combination of concave functions is
concave. Moreover, constraint (2) is convex and constraint (3)
is affine. Hence the feasible set of this optimization problem is
convex. Therefore, P1 is a convex optimization problem and
there exists a globally optimal solution. The Lagrangian of P1
is given by:
L (p,λ) =
∑
i∈K
wiRi −
∑
j∈K
λj
(∑
i∈K
pj,i − pj
)
, (4)
where λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λK)  0 are the Lagrange multipliers
related to the power constraints. Applying the Karush-Kuhn-
1It is assumed that the spectrum is equally divided based on the number
of users.
3Tucker (KKT) conditions [21], we obtain the following neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the optimal primal variables
p∗ and dual variables λ∗:
∂L (p∗,λ∗)
∂p∗j,i
≤ 0, ∀i, j ∈ K, (5)
λ∗j
(∑
i∈K
p∗j,i − pj
)
= 0, ∀j ∈ K, (6)
∑
i∈K
p∗j,i ≤ pj , ∀j ∈ K, (7)
p∗  0, λ∗  0. (8)
Note that the KKT conditions imply that wiR′i(p∗j,i) = λ∗j if
p∗j,i > 0, and wiR′i(p∗j,i) ≤ λ∗j if p∗j,i = 0.
Next we study the concavity of the achievable rates R with
respect to the power allocation matrix p. For an illustration
purpose, we employ the AF relay strategy in this paper. We
model the wireless fading environment by the large-scale path
loss, shadowing, and small-scale Rayleigh fading. The additive
white Gaussian noises (AWGN) at all users are assumed to
be independent circular symmetric complex Gaussian random
variables, each having zero mean and unit variance.
In the first phase of the cooperative communication, each
source node i ∈ K broadcasts its signal xi to all other source
nodes for all j 6= i and its destination. Thus the received
signals at its destination and node j from i are given by,
respectively
yi =
√
pi,ihi,ixi + ni, (9)
and
yi,j =
√
pi,ihi,jxi + nj , ∀j 6= i, (10)
where ni is the AWGN at destination i, hi,j is the channel
gain from source i to destination j, ∀i, j.
In the second phase, all other users participate in the cooper-
ative transmission of user i in the form of AF based distributed
space-time coding. Specifically, each user j ∈ K\ i multiplies
its received signal from user i over a certain time duration,
denoted as yi,j , with a distributed space-time code matrix Aj
and then forwards the coded signal to the destination using
power pj,i. The received signal vector at user i’ destination is
zi =
∑
∀j∈K\i
√
pj,ihj,iAjyi,j + ni. (11)
Here, the distributed space-time code matrices {Aj} are
chosen carefully so that the full diversity order can be achieved
[19]. By employing the maximal-ratio combining for the direct
and cooperative links, the achievable rate of user i can be
written as
Ri =
1
2
log
2
(
1 + pi,i|hi,i|
2
+
∑
∀j∈K\i
pi,i|hi,j |
2pj,i|hj,i|
2
1 + pi,i|hi,j |2 + pj,i|hj,i|2
)
.
Note that Ri is not jointly concave in pi,i and pj,i. To make
the analysis tractable, we adopt the following upper bound
approximation:
Ri ≈ 1
2
log2

1 + pi,i|hi,i|2 + ∑
∀j∈K\i
pi,i|hi,j |2pj,i|hj,i|2
pi,i|hi,j |2 + pj,i|hj,i|2

 ,
(12)
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Fig. 2: Illustration of interaction among nodes.
assuming that the signal amplified and forwarded by the relays
is in the high SNR regime. Such upper bound is tight and
commonly used for AF rate expression in the literature (e.g.,
[8]) for the single-relay case. It can also be proved that Ri in
(12) is strictly concave by evaluating the Hessian matrix [21].
Note that in (11)-(12) we use the general notation, ∀j ∈ K\ i,
for the relay index j with respect to user i. This does not
change the rate results nor the concavity of Ri, because for a
user j who is not involved in the cooperation we can simply
let pj,i = 0. We can also view this as the relay selection
decision of user i. Moreover, if pj,i = 0 for all j ∈ K\ i, then
the transmission mode of user i becomes direct transmission,
otherwise it uses relay transmission mode. In other words,
our proposed power allocation framework implicitly involves
transmission mode selection between direct transmission and
relay transmission.
In the next section, we propose an auction based algorithm
to achieve the optimal solution of P1 in a distributed fashion.
III. AUCTION-BASED DISTRIBUTED POWER ALLOCATION
Auction theory [22] has been viewed as an efficient method
to allocate wireless resource in different scenarios, e.g., rate
control [23], spectrum allocation [24]–[26], spectrum access
[27]–[29], and spectrum sharing [30], [31]. Most of these
schemes are based on a centralized auctioneer (or a seller)
since there is a single divisible resource to be allocated among
bidders (buyers). Therefore, these auction-based resource al-
location schemes cannot be directly applied to our considered
multi-user cooperation scenario.
In this section, we design a distributed algorithm to solve the
problem P1. The distributed algorithm has a nice interpretation
of a multi-auctioneer and multi-bidder auction. We further
analyze the convergence and discuss the implementation issues
in practical networks.
A. Multi-Auctioneer Multi-Bidder Mechanism
We achieve efficient power allocation through a multi-
auctioneer multi-bidder power auction. Each user has two roles
4in the auction: an auctioneer and a bidder. The interaction
of the users is illustrated in Fig. 2, in which each bidder
dynamically decides whether to buy, from which auctioneer(s)
to buy, and how much to buy. In the sequence, each auctioneer
independently announces its trading price and allocates power
to the bidders.
In the proposed approach, each user i submits a bid bj,i
to each user j. When i = j, we assume that user i submits
a virtual bid bi,i to itself, since it also acts as an auctioneer
(denoted as dotted lines in Fig. 2). By bidding for its own
resource, each user i can determine how much power pi,i to
consume for itself, besides how much power pj,i (for all j 6= i)
it buys from others.
Let pi = (π1, π2, . . . , πK) be the price vector of the auc-
tioneers, and b the bidding matrix whose element bj,i means
the willingness bidder i buys from auctioneer j. By definition,
bi = {bj,i}Kj=1, the column i of b, is user i’s bidding vector.
The multi-auctioneer multi-bidder power auction consists of
two steps:
1) For a given price vector pi, each user i ∈ K, deter-
mines its demand vector {pj,i}Kj=1, then submits the
corresponding bid vector {bj,i}Kj=1 to auctioneers;
2) For the collected bids b, each auctioneer j ∈ K,
determines its supply vector {pj,i}Ki=1 and announces
its price πj .
The key challenge is how to design the price vector pi and
bidding matrix b so that the outcome of the proposed power
auction is equivalent to the optimal solution of P1.
We introduce the two-side auction rule as follows:
1) At the side of the bidders, each bidder i ∈ K, submits
it bid proportionally to the price of auctioneer j and the
power it will purchase from auctioneer j, i.e., bj,i =
πjpj,i, ∀j. Intuitively, if pj,i = 0, bidder i does not bid
for auctioneer j.
2) At the side of the auctioneers, we adopt Kelly-
mechanism [23] such that each auctioneer j ∈
K, attempts to maximize the surrogate function∑
i∈K bj,ilogpj,i by allocating power pj,i according the
bids bj,i. Note that the surrogate function can be se-
lected arbitrarily as long as it is differentiable, strictly
increasing, and concave in pj,i.
In what follows, we describe the two-side auction in detail.
1) Bidder-Side Auction: Each bidder i maximizes its sur-
plus, which is the difference between the benefit from buying
power from auctioneers and its payments. For the given prices
pi, bidder i first determines its optimal demand according to
the following surplus maximization (Bidder Sub-Problem):
max
{pj,i}Kj=1
Si = wiRi −
∑
j∈K
πjpj,i. (13)
It is not difficult to prove that the surplus function Si
is jointly concave in {pj,i}Kj=1, where Ri is a function of
{pj,i}Kj=1 (as defined in (12)). Due to the concavity of Si, bid-
der i can optimally choose the unique power vector {p∗j,i}Kj=1
to maximize its profit. Then bidder i submits its optimal bids
to auctioneers according its optimal demand and the given
prices pi:
b∗j,i = p
∗
j,iπj , ∀j. (14)
Differentiating Si with respect to pj,i, we can obtain the
sufficient and necessary first order condition:
∂Si
∂p∗j,i
= wiR
′
i(p
∗
j,i)− πj = 0, ∀i, j. (15)
Observing the KKT conditions of P1, we notice that if
auctioneers announce their prices as
π∗j = λ
∗
j = wiR
′
i(p
∗
j,i), ∀i, j, (16)
the optimal power p∗ in the bidder sub-problem is consistent
with the one in P1.
From above we can see that the individual optimum in the
Bidder Sub-problem is also the global optimum if the prices
are appropriately selected.
2) Auctioneer-Side Auction: After introducing the Bidder
Sub-Problem, we now turn to the auctioneers. Solving the
optimal power supply of each auctioneer j can be formulated
as (Auctioneer Sub-Problem):
max
∑
i∈K
bj,ilogpj,i (17)
s.t.
∑
i∈K
pj,i ≤ pj (18)
variables p  0 (19)
The associated Lagrangian can be written as
L′j =
∑
i∈K
bj,ilogpj,i − µj
(∑
i∈K
pj,i − pj
)
, (20)
where µj is the Lagrange multiplier of auctioneer j. The KKT
conditions for the Auctioneer Sub-Problem are given by
p∗j,i =
bj,i
µ∗j
, ∀i ∈ K, (21)
µ∗j
(∑
i∈K
p∗j,i − pj
)
= 0, (22)
∑
i∈K
p∗j,i ≤ pj , (23)
p∗  0, µ∗j ≥ 0. (24)
By comparing the Auctioneer Sub-Problem with P1, one can
see that if µ = λ and bidders select their bids as follows:
b∗j,i = p
∗
j,iwiR
′
i(p
∗
j,i), (25)
then (21)-(24) are equivalent to (5)-(8) and the solutions of
the Auctioneer Sub-Problem for all auctioneers coincide with
P1.
B. Distributed Algorithm
We now design a mechanism to realize the multi-auctioneer
multi-bidder power auction in a distributed fashion, in which
we incorporate primal-dual algorithms which have been stud-
ied extensively in the literature. The mechanism is executed
iteratively. Formally, we present the detailed mechanism in
Algorithm 1. Each iteration consists of bid update (Algorithm
2), power allocation, and price update. Note that Algorithm 2
5Algorithm 1 Multi-Auctioneer Multi-Bidder Power Auction
Initialization. Set the iteration index t = 0. Set the di-
rect transmission mode to be the initial state for all nodes,
i.e., p(0) = diag(p1, ..., pi, ..., pK). Randomly generate a
K × K bid matrix b(0)  0 and a price vector λ(0) =
(λ
(0)
1 , ..., λ
(0)
i , ..., λ
(0)
K )  0.
repeat
• t← t+ 1.
• Bidder Sub-Problem in (13):
– Bid update. // Algorithm 2
• Auctioneer Sub-Problem in (17):
– Power allocation. Each user j ∈ K (as an auctioneer)
independently allocates the power p(t)ji to user i:
p
(t)
j,i =
b
(t−1)
j,i
λ
(t−1)
j
, for i = 1, 2, ...,K. (26)
– Price update. Each user j ∈ K (as an auctionneer)
updates its price as:
λ
(t)
j = λ
(t−1)
j + ǫj
(∑
i∈K
p
(t)
j,i − pj
)
, (27)
where ǫj is a small constant step-size.
until The price vector λ converges.
Algorithm 2 Bid update
1: t ≥ 1;
2: for each bidder i = 1 : K do
3: for each auctioneer j = 1 : K do
4: if ∂S(t)i /∂p
(t)
j,i > 0 or equivalently wiR′i
(
p
(t)
j,i
)
>
λ
(t−1)
j then
5: Submit bid b(t)j,i = p
(t)
j,iwiR
′
i
(
p
(t)
j,i
)
to auctioneer j;
6: else
7: b(t)j,i = 0 and do not submit bid to auctioneer j;
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
incorporates auctioneer (or relay) selection and transmission
mode selection.
There are several points should be noted. Firstly, from (27),
one can see that we must have
∑
i∈K p
(t)
j,i = pj when t→∞
so that the KKT condition (22) is satisfied as the price λj
cannot be zero.
Secondly, in the procedure of bid update (Algorithm 2), it is
not necessary for each bidder to submit positive bids to all auc-
tioneers in each iteration. Specifically, the auctioneer selection
depends on two factors. (26) shows that the purchased power
is proportional to the submitted bids and inversely proportional
to auctioneers’ prices. This means that the higher willingness
bidder i has for auctioneer j and the lower price auctioneer j
announces, the more power bidder i can get from auctioneer
j. Therefore, a feasible way of auctioneer selection for bidder
i is to observe how Si varies with pj,i, i.e., observe the sign of
∂Si
∂pj,i
or, equivalently, wiR′i(pj,i)−λj . Note that p is obtained
by Algorithm 1 in the current iteration, and the price vector λ
is obtained in the latest previous iteration. Let us first discuss
the case of i 6= j. If ∂Si
∂pj,i
> 0 or wiR
′
i(pj,i) > λj , this
means that bidder i can obtain a larger profit by increasing
the purchased power pj,i then bidder i bids for auctioneer j,
otherwise auctioneer j should not be selected for bidder i. This
is due to that the channel gain hi,j is week such that bidder i
cannot benefit from auctioneer j, or many other bidders bid for
auctioneer j so that auctioneer j raises its price, then the profit
bidder i benefits from auctioneer j cannot compensate the
payment bidder i pays to auctioneer j. The bidding criterion
is also applicable to the case of i = j. If ∂Si
∂pi,i
> 0, this means
user i can increase its profit by increasing the consuming
power pi,i, due to the channel gain hi,i or hi,j (for some j) is
strong then it has more willingness to consume the power for
itself, otherwise user i prefers to sell its power to other users
because it can obtain higher profit by charging others, rather
than consumes the power itself.
Thirdly, in the proposed auction algorithm, it is assumed that
all users are price takers, which means that they do not choose
their bids strategically to impact the auctioneers’ prices. The
assumption is reasonable when there are many bidders such
that each bidder’s impact on the prices is small, and has
been widely used in the literature (e.g., [16]–[18], [23]–[31]).
However, when the number of users is small, then users’
price anticipating behavior may change resource allocation,
and the system should be modeled as a game between the
users and the network. The corresponding solution concept is
Nash equilibrium, and it is well known that Nash equilibrium
often leads to network performance degradation comparing
with a globally optimal solution. Such performance gap is
often called the “price of anarchy” [32]. Notice that our goal
is to design a distributed algorithm to solve a system-level
optimization problem instead of game theoretical analysis.
Proposition 1: For any initial condition (p(0), b(0),λ(0)),
the proposed multi-auctioneer multi-bidder power auction
globally converges to the globally optimal point (p∗, b∗,λ∗)
as t→∞.
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
C. Discussion on Implementation Issues
In this subsection, we show how the proposed multi-
auctioneer multi-bidder power auction can be applied in prac-
tical distributed networks.
First of all, we assume that the users interact each other
synchronously. The synchronization can be implemented at
the head of each transmission packet, in which pilot symbols
carry out the task. This means at the beginning of the auction,
every user (bidder role) bids for power simultaneously, then
every user (auctioneer role) allocates power and announces
price simultaneously. It is worth noting that our algorithm is
also applicable for the case where the users interact each other
asynchronously (e.g., there exist some malfunctional users that
may not update their actions as frequently as the others) but
leads to longer convergence time, which will be detailed in the
numerical results. We assume the synchronization here only
for reducing the convergence time.
6Second, the source of user i needs to know the local
information, including hi,i, hj,i, and pj,i for all j 6= i.
Specifically, the destination of user i needs to send the CSI hi,i
to its own source, and the source of user j needs to send the
CSI hj,i to the source of user i for all i 6= j. Here it is assumed
that channel estimation can be implemented at both source and
destination of each user by pilot symbols in the head of frame,
then the CSI can be sent via a feedback channel. Moreover,
the source of user i can know the number of available relayed
nodes and the amount of bidding power pj,i by itself selecting
other users for bidding.
Third, a trading place (i.e., public channel) is needed for in-
teracting auction information including the initial information
(p(0), b(0),λ(0)), and iterative information (p(t), b(t),λ(t)). In
each iteration, each user (bidder role) first submits bids and
then determines price and allocates power (auctioneer role)
according to the collected bids. At the end of each iteration,
each user makes a decision and updates its bid and price.
Note that an auctioneer’s decision is impacted by bidders’
immediate willingness how much to buy from it, rather than
other auctioneers’ prices. Thus an auctioneer unnecessarily
decodes the prices of others, though they are announced in
an open manner.
Fourth, an appropriate step size for each user is needed.
In this paper, we adopt the constant step size rule in (27).2
Generally speaking, a larger step size requires less time per
iteration but leads to more iterations, while a smaller step size
requires more time per iteration but leads to less iterations.
In the proposed protocol, if the auction phase ends then the
process turns into the transmission phase. While if any user
does not converge at the end of the auction phase, it will
be forced turn to the transmission phase. In this case, it can
randomly make a decision, which results in the outcome is
not optimal and the performance may degrade substantially.
Therefore it is essential that each user achieves stability in
the auction phase. A feasible way is to enlarge the period of
the auction phase, which will reduce the spectrum efficiency.
Here we assume that a slot can be designed long enough in the
system so that the overhead of the auction phase is negligible.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
distributed algorithm using simulation. In what follows, we
first consider an example of four users for explicitly illustrating
our proposed multi-auctioneer multi-bidder power auction.
Then we demonstrate the throughput efficiency of the proposed
algorithm over the direct transmission scheme in a network
with different number of users. Without loss of generality, we
let wi = 1 for all users.
2Note that there exist other three step size rules, i.e., constant step length,
square-summable but not summable, and diminishing step size rules [33].
They all can guarantee toward the global optimum but lead to different
convergence time, and they have their own advantages and disadvantages [33].
How to choose and switch the step size rules in the updating procedure is
important in practice, but a detailed discussion seems to be out of the scope
of this paper.
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A. A Toy Example of Four Users
To easily illustrate the details of the proposed distributed
algorithm for multiuser cooperation, we first consider a toy
example with four users. The system setup for the four-user
network is a two-dimensional plane of size 1 × 1 km as
shown in Fig. 3, where the destination is located at (0, 0),
and four nodes are located at (0.2, 0.5), (0.4, 0.3), (0.5, 0.8),
and (0.8, 0.6). All nodes have the same maximum power
constraints, i.e., pi = 10 dB, ∀i ∈ K. The central frequency is
around 5 GHz. The statistical path loss model and shadowing
are referred to [34], where we set the path loss exponent to
be 3.5 and the standard deviation of log-normal shadowing
is 5.8 dB. The small-scale fading between any two nodes is
characterized by the normalized Rayleigh fading.
Fig. 3 presents a topology of the network in the initial
state, where all users transmit information with their maximum
power without cooperation. By implementing the proposed
power auction, the nodes are stimulated to cooperate with
each other. For a given channel realization, the final state of
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the network topology is shown in Fig. 4, where dash lines
represent direct transmission and solid lines represent relay
transmission, and each color represents the links of one user.
One can see that the nearer a node is to the destination, the
more likely it acts as a relay. For example, as node 1 is the
nearest to the destination, it forwards the information of other
three nodes, and node 2 forwards the information of node 3
and node 4. It is also found that node 2 not only helps node 3
and node 4 but also needs help from node 1. We further show
the power distribution for each node in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the dynamic strategies and payoffs
of the users, respectively, using step size ǫi = 10−3, ∀i ∈ K.
The total payoff of user i illustrated in the figure is defined
as Ri −
∑
j∈K pj,iλj + λi
∑
j∈K pi,j , ∀i ∈ K, which is the
sum profits of both the auctioneer and bidder. First of all,
we can find that the prices and surplus are convergent (about
60 iterations in this example). Secondly, one can see that the
more likely a node acts as a relay, the higher price it addresses,
and the higher surplus it can achieve. Thirdly, for node 1 and
node 2 acting as relays, they need more iterations than node
3 and node 4. This can be interpreted as that node 1 and node
2 are in a dilemma whether to transmit themselves or help
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Fig. 8: Convergence speed of payoffs using ǫi = 10−3, ∀i.
others. If they decide to help others, they have to face the
tradeoff between how much power they retain for themselves
and how much power they devote to others. Thus they need
more interaction to make decisions. The observations coincide
with the common sense of economics.
Though we have theoretically proved that the proposed algo-
rithm can converge to the globally optimal solution when the
length of the auction phase goes to infinite (i.e., t→∞), it is
practical to investigate the probability of convergence in finite
time, rather than to make the auction convergent every time.
Fig. 9 presents the cumulative distribution functions (CDF)
of the price converging iteration using different step sizes.
We observe that a small step size can raise the probability
of convergence. For example, to achieve the probability 1 of
convergence we need about 100, 60, and 2 iterations for step
sizes ǫi = 10−3, ǫi = 10−4, and ǫi = 10−5, respectively.
Therefore, if the step size is small enough, our proposed
mechanism can converge to the globally optimal solution with
probability 1. We can further see that, for the same probability
of convergence, node 1 and node 2 need more iterations, the
interpretation of which is addressed in the above paragraph.
Finally, we consider the impacts of asynchronous updates
among nodes in Fig. 10, with the 10 dB maximum power
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Fig. 9: CDF of price converging iterations with step sizes ǫi = 10−3, ǫi = 10−4 and ǫi = 10−5, ∀i, respectively.
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Fig. 10: Node 4’s update frequencies are the same, 1/4, and 1/20 as others, respectively.
constraint and a constant step-size ǫi = 10−3 for all nodes.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that node 4 does
not update frequently as others (e.g., malfunctional user). For
a given channel realization, it needs about 200 iterations for
convergence if all nodes update their actions synchronously.
When node 4 updates slowly, the system convergence times
becomes about 300 and 1400 iterations if node 4’s update
frequency is 1/4 and 1/20 of others, respectively. This shows
that a slow updating node will slow down the overall conver-
gence. Moreover, from the figure we observe that the proposed
algorithm can converge to the global optimum, regardless of
the slow updating node’s update frequency (as long as it keeps
updating). In other words, the asynchronous updates does not
affect the network performance except the convergence time.
The reason is that P1 is essentially a convex optimization
problem.
B. Networks with More Users
In this subsection, we study the networks with more users.
First, we compare the throughput performance of the proposed
power auction algorithm in comparison with the direct trans-
mission scheme in Fig. 11, with pi = 10 dB and pi = 5 dB,
∀i, respectively. Here, a total of 1000 independent channel
realizations are used. The locations of nodes are random but
uniformly distributed, varying with each channel realization.
The step size ǫi = 10−3 is used, ∀i. It is seen that the proposed
algorithm outperforms the direct transmission scheme by a
significant margin, especially when SNR is high or/and the
number of nodes is large. This is consistent with the previous
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Fig. 11: Throughput comparison of two schemes.
study on cooperative communications from an information
theoretic perspective [2], [3]. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 12,
we can observe that the complexity of the proposed algorithm
does not increase considerably even in the case of large
number of nodes.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a distributed framework for
resource allocation in cooperative networks. We solved the
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Fig. 12: Price convergence of 20 nodes. Each line represents
one node.
problem by mapping it into the multi-auctioneer multi-bidder
power auction. By following the proposed power auction,
each user can capture the optimal tradeoff of power allocation
between the transmitter and forwarder roles, and their behavior
move towards the globally optimal solution for weighted
sum rates maximization. We further designed a distributed
realization mechanism to achieve the global optimum. Our
proposed framework can be generally applied to different
classes of networks, e.g., uplink cellular networks, ad hoc
networks, and peer-to-peer networks.
There are several directions to extend the results in this
paper. This paper took the nonregenerative based AF relay
strategy as an example when solving P1. We can also use
other more advanced regenerative relay strategies (e.g., DF)
or hybrid relay strategies for the similar problem, but the
analysis will be more challenging. Moreover, this paper aimed
to design distributed algorithms for solving the global op-
timization problem instead of game theoretical analysis. It
will be interesting to further consider the incentive issues
of the users (e.g., price-anticipating users) in a distributed
network. Also, we assume that the message passing is timely
and accurate. It will be very interesting to understand more
about the performance of the algorithm under delayed and
erroneous message passing (e.g., [35]) in our future work.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The proof is based on LaSalle’s invariance principle [36]
and similar with that in [37]: Consider the differential equa-
tion: y˙(t) = f(y(t)). Let Y : D → R be a radially un-
bounded3, continuously differentiable, positive definite4 func-
tion such that Y˙ ≤ 0 for all Z ∈ D. Let E be the set of points
in D where Y˙ = 0. Let M be the largest invariant set5 in E .
Then every solution starting in D approaches M as t→∞.
3g(Z) is radially unbounded if lim‖Z‖→∞ g(Z) =∞.
4
Y is positive definite if Y (Z∗) = 0 for some Z∗, and Y (Z) > 0 for
all Z 6= Z∗.
5M is an invariant set if Z(0) ∈M implies Z(t) ∈ M for all t ≥ 0.
The Lyapunov function can be written as
V (λ) =
1
2
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)2
. (28)
It is obviously that this function is radially unbounded. We
now study time-derivative of this function. Differentiating this
function, we obtain:
V˙ (λ) =
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)(∑
i∈K
p
(t)
j,i − pj
)+
λj
(29)
≤
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)(∑
i∈K
p
(t)
j,i − pj
)
(30)
=
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)(
p
(t)
j,i − p∗j,i
)
+
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)(∑
i∈K
p∗j,i − pj
)
(31)
≤
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈K
(
λ
(t)
j − λ∗j
)(
p
(t)
j,i − p∗j,i
)
(32)
=
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈K
(
b
(t)
j,i
p
(t)
j,i
− b
∗
j,i
p∗j,i
)(
p
(t)
j,i − p∗j,i
)
(33)
≤ 0, (34)
where (30) follows from (29) due to the nature of the projec-
tion (a)+b , i.e., if the projection is active then (29) is zero while
(30) is positive, otherwise the equality holds. (32) follows due
to the fact that
∑
i∈K p
∗
j,i = pj , or λ
∗
j = 0 if
∑
i∈K p
∗
j,i < pj .
Finally, if bids chose as bj,i = pj,iR′i (pj,i), (34) follows due
to the concavity and monotonicity of Ri.
Consequently, we have proved V˙ (λ) ≤ 0. It also implies
that
E := {λ : V˙ (λ) = 0}
is contained in the set
S : {λ : (29) = (30) = (32) = (33) = 0}.
Let M be the largest invariant set of the primal-dual
algorithm contained in E , then λ(t) converges to M as t→∞.
Since M ⊂ E ⊂ S, λ(t) must satisfy V˙ (λ) = 0 as t → ∞.
Thus limt→∞ λ(t) = λ∗.
Since p and b vary along with λ, according to LaSalle’s
invariance principle [36], it implies that (p(t), b(t),λ(t)) con-
verges to the globally optimal point (p∗, b∗,λ∗).
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